Are Weighted Games Sufficiently Good for Binary Voting?

Sascha Kurz ()
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Sascha Kurz: University of Bayreuth

Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, 2021, vol. 38, issue 1, No 3, 29-36

Abstract: Abstract Binary “yes”–“no” decisions in a legislative committee or a shareholder meeting are commonly modeled as a weighted game. However, there are noteworthy exceptions. E.g., the voting rules of the European Council according to the Treaty of Lisbon use a more complicated construction. Here we want to study the question if we lose much from a practical point of view, if we restrict ourselves to weighted games. To this end, we invoke power indices that measure the influence of a member in binary decision committees. More precisely, we compare the achievable power distributions of weighted games with those from a reasonable superset of weighted games. It turns out that the deviation is relatively small.

Keywords: Power measurement; Weighted games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s41412-021-00111-6

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