An Epicurean State of Nature

Peter Vanderschraaf ()
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Peter Vanderschraaf: University of Arizona

Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, 2022, vol. 39, issue 2, No 4, 145-184

Abstract: Abstract I present a game-theoretic model of an Epicurean State of Nature based upon Epicurus’ proto-evolutionary account of human development. I argue that for Epicurus the State of Nature has at least two stages. I model the first stage, where according to Epicurus the adult humans lead mainly solitary lives and are all roughly equally capable of harming each other, as an extension of the Hawk-Dove game where agents can follow a contingency strategy. I argue that at this first stage the individuals are likely to converge to a contingency strategy convention where they generally avoid conflict. I model the second stage, where according to Epicurus families emerge and join to form communities, by introducing heterogeneity with respect to ability to harm into the population engaging in the extended Hawk-Dove game of the first stage. In particular, in some extended Hawk-Dove encounters weak agents who are relatively vulnerable members of some families encounter strong counterpart agents who belong to other families. I argue that this heterogeneity can result in the population converging to an equilibrium corresponding to a State of Nature war. I conclude Epicurus can reach a conclusion similar to Hobbes’ conclusion that war is inevitable in a State of Nature. But Epicurus would arrive at this Hobbesian conclusion by a rather un-Hobbesian route, for the supporting argument relies upon significant inequalities in powers among the residents of the State of Nature.

Keywords: State of nature; Hawk-dove game; Justice-conventionalism; Contingency strategy; Evolutionarily stable strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B11 B31 C73 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s41412-022-00118-7

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