The Social Contract, the Game of Life and the Shadow of the Future

Brian Skyrms ()
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Brian Skyrms: University of California

Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, 2022, vol. 39, issue 2, No 2, 117-125

Abstract: Abstract Ken Binmore’s (1994, 1998) treatment of his Game of Life as a bargaining game and his treatment of morality as an equilibrium selection device for that game, are examined in the context of repeated games with both infinite and finite horizon. With a finite horizon, there are three different viable approaches. They differ in the way they impact his treatment of morality.

Keywords: Social Contract; Game of life; Bargaining; Shadow of the future; B5; C7; D6; Y8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s41412-022-00119-6

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