Why Have Leaders At All? Hume and Hobbes, with a Dash of Nash

Kaushik Basu ()
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Kaushik Basu: Cornell University

Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, 2022, vol. 39, issue 2, No 7, 219-244

Abstract: Abstract The insight that much of the seeming order in society happens because of conventions and implicit social contracts leaves open the question as to why we need leaders at all? The aim of this paper is to explain why, in some social contexts, leaders may be needed and then analyze in some detail what consequences a leader has on the games we play in life, and hence on social outcomes. The paper also discusses the moral responsibility of the leader for the actions taken by the followers, in abstract settings and also in real life.

Keywords: Leadership game; Political power; Jigsaw focal point; Leviathan equilibrium; Moral responsibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s41412-022-00129-4

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