Revealing private interests of non-state actor coalitions in negotiating access and benefit sharing

Arthur Buitenen (), Arco Timmermans () and Gerard Breeman ()
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Arthur Buitenen: Leiden University
Arco Timmermans: Leiden University
Gerard Breeman: Leiden University

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 2025, vol. 25, issue 3, No 8, 469-488

Abstract: Abstract This research shows that applying a public–private interests lens is instructive for explaining positions of non-state actor engagements in international negotiations of environmental agreements. The research specifically focuses on ad-hoc lobbying coalitions as a feature in non-state actor engagements in negotiations. These ad-hoc coalitions have not yet been researched extensively. The analysis below focuses on the negotiations of access and benefit sharing from the use of digital sequence information (DSI) of natural resources under the Convention of Biological Diversity. Research identifies five ad-hoc lobbying coalitions among 82 unique non-state actor submissions to the negotiations. Analysis of prevailing themes in the negotiations through the public–private interests lens reveals that ad-hoc coalitions use public as well as private interests arguments. They claim to advance freely accessible and unprohibited use of DSI for scientific research to the benefit of many. They also use arguments in pursuit of private interests benefiting smaller groups. This research also reveals that coalitions with scientific membership are transparent about the private interests they pursue based on their expertise. They pursue these interests just as fiercely as the coalition of business and industry associations.

Keywords: Public–private interests; Lobbying coalitions; Environmental agreements; Access and benefit sharing; Digital sequence information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s10784-025-09676-y

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