Industry Dynamics á La Stackelberg with Stochastic Capital Accumulation

Luca Lambertini ()

Chapter Chapter 2 in Entrepreneurship, Growth, and Innovation, 2006, pp 23-39 from Springer

Abstract: 5. Conclusions I have described a stochastic differential game in which firms invest to increase productive capacity, following time-consistent open-loop Stackelberg strategies. The equilibrium of the model highlights different growth rates along the saddle path. Accordingly, the analysis carried out in this paper is clearly in contrast with Gibrat’s Law. Moreover, it appears that there are admissible cases where the followers’s growth rates are larger than the leaders’, e.g. when the representative leader is indeed bigger than the representative follower in terms of installed capacity. This may ultimately lead to situations where equilibrium profits are larger for followers than for leaders.

Keywords: Differential Game; Stackelberg Game; Investment Effort; Stochastic Differential Game; Saddle Path (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1007/0-387-32314-7_2

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