Introduction

Sergio Mittlaender ()
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Sergio Mittlaender: Fundação Getulio Vargas Law School in São Paulo (FGV Direito SP)

Chapter Chapter 1 in Equity, Efficiency, and Ethics in Remedies for Breach of Contract, 2022, pp 1-17 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The introduction presents the conundrum concerning the role and value of compensation for breach of contract in legal and economic theories of contract law. While compensation is the fundamental principle of remedies for breach in legal theories, it has no intrinsic value in economic theories, serving only as an instrument to incentivize promisors to perform whenever performance is socially efficient. Consistently, economic analysis of law assigns no more than contingent or external reasons for its existence, with scholars recently making the case against compensation for breach. This thesis provides a justification, on social welfare grounds, for why compensation is fundamental in the law of remedies for breach of contract. The introduction further presents the objective of the research, the research questions tackled in the book, the outline, and the methods employed.

Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:intchp:978-3-031-10804-4_1

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-10804-4_1

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