Retaliation, Remedies, and Contracts

Sergio Mittlaender ()
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Sergio Mittlaender: Fundação Getulio Vargas Law School in São Paulo (FGV Direito SP)

Chapter Chapter 5 in Equity, Efficiency, and Ethics in Remedies for Breach of Contract, 2022, pp 127-166 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The present chapter presents the empirical study, firstly, on the behavioral effect of the primary duty to keep promises and contract on the promisor’s decision to perform or breach and on the promisee’s decision to retaliate or not to breach. With respect to the latter, the experiment further attempts to investigate the circumstances and types of contingencies where promisees in effect are most tempted to retaliate to breach, and it thereby tests the theoretical hypotheses on the causes of retaliation to breach developed in the previous chapter. Secondly, the empirical study focuses on the behavioral effect of the secondary duty to pay damages for breach on the promisor’s decision to perform or breach, net of the effect of the moral force of keeping promises, and then on the promisee’s decision to retaliate or not to breach.

Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:intchp:978-3-031-10804-4_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-10804-4_5

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