Promises and Limitations of Market-Based Mechanisms in Crowdfunding

Ana Odorović ()
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Ana Odorović: Universität Hamburg

Chapter Chapter 3 in Overcoming Asymmetric Information in the Crowdfunding Market, 2025, pp 49-164 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter analyses market-based mechanisms for overcoming information asymmetries in crowdfunding: voluntary disclosures, signalling, and platform gatekeeping. Drawing on a new framework for reviewing empirical evidence, the analysis shows that while investors respond to overall disclosure levels, they pay limited attention to hard data and place greater weight on soft data. Signals may substitute for or complement disclosures, particularly when verification is costly. However, signals valued in traditional finance are not equally appreciated by crowd investors, with social capital and information cascades proving especially influential. Platform gatekeeping involves various reintermediation services aimed at mitigating hidden information and hidden action, with their scope and intensity varying considerably across platforms.

Keywords: Information asymmetry; Market-based investor protection; Voluntary disclosures; Signalling; Platform intermediation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:intchp:978-3-032-04118-0_3

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-04118-0_3

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