Does a Bespoke Regulation Matter for Market Outcomes? Evidence from Equity Platforms in the UK
Ana Odorović ()
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Ana Odorović: Universität Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics
Chapter Chapter 6 in Overcoming Asymmetric Information in the Crowdfunding Market, 2025, pp 267-324 from Springer
Abstract:
Abstract This chapter presents an empirical analysis of changes in the UK equity crowdfunding market following the adoption of a bespoke regulatory regime on 1 April 2014. The analysis examines effects on the demand side (fundraisers), supply side (investors), and market outcomes. Post-regulation, campaigns exhibit stronger quality signals, greater investor participation, and higher success rates. However, regression analysis finds no significant effect of regulation on investor participation or campaign success once campaign characteristics are controlled, suggesting that fundraiser quality mediates the regulatory impact. Interestingly, average investment declines, particularly among new investors. This indicates that the new regime legitimises crowdfunding among a broader investor base, shifting its income or wealth distribution towards the left tail.
Keywords: Crowdfunding regulation; Regulatory impact; Effects of crowdfunding rules; Investor protection; Post-regulation effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:intchp:978-3-032-04118-0_6
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-04118-0_6
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