A History of Collusion: The Persistence of Cartels in South Africa

Liberty Mncube and Sunél Grimbeek ()
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Sunél Grimbeek: Competition Commission South Africa

A chapter in Competition Law Enforcement in the BRICS and in Developing Countries, 2016, pp 337-347 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter discusses the persistence of cartels in South Africa. In 1996, South Africa’s first democratic administration took significant steps to liberalize many of the formerly price regulated markets. Deregulation and liberalisation led to the break-up of regulated cartels. We argue in this chapter that liberalisation may have inadvertently, by increasing competition in formerly protected markets, have increased the incentives for firms to participate in cartels.

Keywords: History of collusion; Liberalisation of regulated markets; Firm incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:intchp:978-3-319-30948-4_14

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-30948-4_14

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