Opportunism in LSLI Contracts: An Economic View

Luis Tomás Montilla Fernández
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Luis Tomás Montilla Fernández: University of Hamburg

Chapter Chapter 4 in Large-Scale Land Investments in Least Developed Countries, 2017, pp 205-259 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Following the analysis of legal mechanisms in IL to enforce the rights to food and property, and showing how IL fails to protect the rights of locals, this chapter will follow a social science approach to LSLIs. In order to do so, we will consider the effects of LSLIs as a result of opportunistic behaviour producing detrimental effects for third parties. We will apply NIE to analyse what gives rise to opportunism and how it can be tackled. After this brief overview we will introduce NIE and the concept of opportunism. We will suggest that opportunism has two sources, namely prohibitively high agency costs and incomplete contracts.

Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:intchp:978-3-319-65280-1_4

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-65280-1_4

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