Excessiveness of Prices as an Abuse of Dominant Position: The Case of India
Augustine Peter and
Neha Singh ()
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Augustine Peter: Competition Commission of India
Neha Singh: Competition Commission of India
A chapter in Excessive Pricing and Competition Law Enforcement, 2018, pp 231-284 from Springer
Abstract:
Abstract Competition Act, 2002, successor to MRTP Act, 1969, addresses unfair/excessive pricing in three ways: price overcharge through horizontal agreements, RPM coupled with self-administered MRP and, finally, AoD, which is the focus of the chapter. While being careful not to chill the dynamic effects in the market, case-specific factors are scrutinized by the Commission before arriving at excessiveness of price. Cost, profitability, industry average price, prices in similar markets, etc. though important, have not been found to be conclusive of excessive pricing. Unscientific market definition, presence of IPR and high-tech industries may render identification of excessive prices difficult. In regulated sectors, the Commission is cautious in intervening though it possesses the mandate. Peter and Singh also touch upon remedies for addressing the issue in the Indian context. Division of enterprise and compulsory licensing are remedies in extreme cases.
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:intchp:978-3-319-92831-9_10
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-92831-9_10
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