Spectrum Auctions

Karla Hoffman ()
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Karla Hoffman: George Mason University

Chapter Chapter 7 in Wireless Network Design, 2011, pp 147-176 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Most developed countries allocate radio spectrum by auction. The Simultaneous Ascending Auction (SAA) has proven to work well for this application. Recently, new designs that allow package bidding have been proposed. These designs have only been tried in the past few years. We first provide some historical background regarding the allocation of spectrum, describe the use of the SAA design and its modifications over the past 15 years, and then highlight the new advances in combinatorial auction designs and their use for the allocation of spectrum.

Keywords: Federal Communication Commission; Combinatorial Auction; Auction Mechanism; Winning Bidder; Clock Phase (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4419-6111-2_7

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