Equilibria in Competitive Location Models

H. A. Eiselt ()
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H. A. Eiselt: University of New Brunswick

Chapter Chapter 7 in Foundations of Location Analysis, 2011, pp 139-162 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Whereas the usual location models locate facilities based on the wishes and objectives of a single decision maker, competitive location models consider the location of facilities that are under the jurisdiction of more than one decision maker. The economist Hotelling (1929) was the first to introduce competition into location models. His results stood unchallenged for fifty years, until d’Aspremont et al. (1979) corrected an inconsistency that invalidated Hotelling’s main result. Nonetheless, this has not diminished the originality and importance of the original contribution, and it is also the reason why the present paper reviews Hotelling’s contribution and its impact on location models with multiple decision makers.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Transportation Cost; Equilibrium Price; Ideal Point; Reaction Function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4419-7572-0_7

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