Compliance with Social Norms as an Evolutionary Stable Equilibrium

Francisco Cabo, Ana García-González () and Mercedes Molpeceres-Abella ()
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Ana García-González: Universidad de Valladolid
Mercedes Molpeceres-Abella: Universidad de Valladolid

A chapter in Games in Management Science, 2020, pp 283-313 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This paper analyzes the compliance with social norms optimally established by a benevolent central planner. Since compliance is costly, agents have an incentive to free-ride on others, in a public good game. We distinguish two types of agents: standard pro-self agents (Sanchos) whose payoffs are defined by a prisoner’s dilemma game dominated by the non-compliance strategy, and pro-social Quixotes, who still have an incentive to free-ride, although prefer compliance over mutual defection (as in a snowdrift game). Compliance is analyzed in a two-population evolutionary game considering an imitative revision protocol. Individuals from one population play against and imitate agents within their own but also the other population. Inter-population interaction and imitation allow us to investigate under which circumstances some Sanchos might imitate compliant Quixotes, so escaping the non-compliance equilibrium characteristic of an isolated population of Sanchos. Correspondingly, we analyze the conditions under which the interaction with the population of selfish Sanchos increases or decreases the compliance rate among altruistic Quixotes.

Keywords: Two-population evolutionary game; Heterogeneous preferences; Prisoner’s dilemma game; Snowdrift game; Social norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:isochp:978-3-030-19107-8_16

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8_16

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