On the Stability of a Two-Player International Environmental Agreement with Intra-Industry Trade

Sébastien Debia ()
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Sébastien Debia: HEC Montréal

A chapter in Games in Management Science, 2020, pp 369-380 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract An international environmental agreement is an unstable coalition by nature, which results in a drive to design mechanisms to provide stability. This note numerically shows that when an international environmental agreement is coupled with intra-industry trade with complementary intermediate goods, then two-player cooperation is a Nash equilibrium. This result may be of interest given that over half the trade between developed countries is intra-industry.

Keywords: International environmental agreement; Intra-industry trade; Cooperative game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:isochp:978-3-030-19107-8_20

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8_20

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