Stable Coalition Structures in Dynamic Competitive Environment

Elena Parilina () and Artem Sedakov ()
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Artem Sedakov: Saint Petersburg State University

A chapter in Games in Management Science, 2020, pp 381-396 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We consider a finite horizon dynamic competition model in discrete time in which firms are not restricted from cooperation with each other and can form coalitions of any size. For every coalition of firms, we determine profits of its members by two approaches: without the redistribution of profits inside the coalition and with such redistribution using a solution from cooperative game theory. Next, for each approach we examine the stability of a coalition structure in the game. When we find a stable coalition structure, we then verify whether it is dynamically stable, that is, stable over time with respect to the same profit distribution method chosen in the initial time period.

Keywords: Dynamic competition; Coalition structure; Stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:isochp:978-3-030-19107-8_21

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8_21

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