A Steady-State Game of a Net-Zero Emission Climate Regime

Olivier Bahn () and Alain Haurie ()
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Olivier Bahn: HEC Montréal
Alain Haurie: ORDECSYS

A chapter in Games in Management Science, 2020, pp 115-130 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this paper we propose a very simple steady-state game model that represents schematically interactions between coalitions of countries in achieving a necessary net-zero emission of GHGs in order to stabilize climate over the long term. We start from a situation where m coalitions exist and behave as m players in a game of sharing a global emission budget that can only be maintained by negative emission activities. We compare a fully “cooperative” solution with a Nash equilibrium solution implemented through an international emission trading scheme. We characterize the fully cooperative and Nash equilibrium solutions for this game in a deterministic context.

Keywords: Carbon capture and storage; Carbon dioxide removal; Climate change; Mitigation; Integrated assessment; Steady-state game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:isochp:978-3-030-19107-8_7

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8_7

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