Dynamic Coordination of Multiple Agents in a Class of Differential Games Through a Generalized Linear Reward Scheme

Boaz Golany, Konstantin Kogan () and Charles S. Tapiero
Additional contact information
Boaz Golany: Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management
Konstantin Kogan: Bar Ilan University
Charles S. Tapiero: Polytechnic Institute of New York University

A chapter in Models and Methods in Economics and Management Science, 2014, pp 183-201 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We consider a wide class of dynamic problems characterized by multiple, non-cooperative agents operating under a general control rule. Since each agent follows its own objective function and these functions are interdependent, control efforts made by each agent may affect the performance of the other agents and thus affect the overall performance of the system. We show that recently developed dynamic linear reward/penalty schemes can be generalized to provide coordination of the multiple agents in a broad-spectrum dynamic environment. When the reward scheme is applied, the agents are induced to choose the system-wide optimal solution even though they operate in a decentralized decision-making environment.

Keywords: Supply chain management; Supply chain coordination; Differential games; The maximum principle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:isochp:978-3-319-00669-7_10

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783319006697

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-00669-7_10

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in International Series in Operations Research & Management Science from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().