Effizienz und Stabilität von Zweckverbänden

Tobias Hiller ()

Review of Regional Research: Jahrbuch für Regionalwissenschaft, 2011, vol. 31, issue 1, 9 pages

Abstract: In this paper, we employ the coalition structure approach of cooperative game theory to analyse three problems. First, we group local authorities in special purpose associations in an optimal way. Second, we use the PCore (Casajus, A, Tutic, A ( 2007 ) http://www.uni-leipzig.de/~micro/pcore.pdf ) to allocate the resulting costs of these special purpose associations. Third, we determine the circumstances under which the legislature should group local authorities in special purpose associations and implement the subsequent cost-sharing. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2011

Keywords: Zweckverbände; Kooperative Spieltheorie; PCore; C71; H11; Special purpose associations; Cooperative game theory; PCore (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.1007/s10037-011-0050-1

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