A coordination mechanism for a scheduling game with parallel-batching machines

Q. Q. Nong (), G. Q. Fan and Q. Z. Fang
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Q. Q. Nong: Ocean University of China
G. Q. Fan: Ocean University of China
Q. Z. Fang: Ocean University of China

Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 2017, vol. 33, issue 2, No 12, 567-579

Abstract: Abstract In this paper we consider the scheduling problem with parallel-batching machines from a game theoretic perspective. There are m parallel-batching machines each of which can handle up to b jobs simultaneously as a batch. The processing time of a batch is the time required for processing the longest job in the batch, and all the jobs in a batch start and complete at the same time. There are n jobs. Each job is owned by a rational and selfish agent and its individual cost is the completion time of its job. The social cost is the largest completion time over all jobs, the makespan. We design a coordination mechanism for the scheduling game problem. We discuss the existence of pure Nash Equilibria and offer upper and lower bounds on the price of anarchy of the coordination mechanism. We show that the mechanism has a price of anarchy no more than $$2-\frac{2}{3b}-\frac{1}{3\max \{m,b\}}$$ 2 - 2 3 b - 1 3 max { m , b } .

Keywords: Game; Scheduling; Coordination mechanism; Nash Equilibrium; Price of anarchy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10878-015-9980-9

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