Do efforts to reduce the supply of illicit drugs increase turf war violence? a theoretical analysis

Robert Burrus ()

Journal of Economics and Finance, 1999, vol. 23, issue 3, 226-234

Abstract: This paper models illicit drug dealers as territorial monopolists. The model shows that an increase in efforts to reduce the supply of illicit drugs decreases a dealer’s expected monopoly returns over drug turf. Consequently, efforts to acquire drug turf through violence are reduced. Copyright Springer 1999

Date: 1999
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DOI: 10.1007/BF02757707

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