Simultaneous and sequential choice in a symmetric two-player game with canyon-shaped payoffs

Chia-Hung Sun ()
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Chia-Hung Sun: Soochow University

The Japanese Economic Review, 2020, vol. 71, issue 2, No 4, 219 pages

Abstract: Abstract This paper investigates a symmetric two-player game with canyon-shaped payoffs, in which a player’s payoff function is smooth and concave above and below the diagonal, but not differentiable on the diagonal. We demonstrate that there exists a first-mover advantage when the two players move sequentially and a player’s preference to the opponent’s choice is monotonic and identical between a higher strategy player and a lower strategy player. We also show that our symmetric two-player game may yield the first-mover advantage outcome in an endogenous timing game with observable delay.

Keywords: Simultaneous game; Sequential game; Endogenous timing; Strategic complements; Strategic substitutes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/s42973-019-00011-0

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