Project finance or corporate finance for renewable energy? an agent-based insight

Thomas Baldauf () and Patrick Jochem
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Thomas Baldauf: German Aerospace Center (DLR)
Patrick Jochem: German Aerospace Center (DLR)

Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, 2024, vol. 19, issue 4, No 8, 759-805

Abstract: Abstract State-of-the-art macroeconomic agent-based models (ABMs) include an increasing level of detail in the energy sector. However, the possible financing mechanisms of renewable energy are rarely considered. In this study, an investment model for power plants is conceptualized, in which energy investors interact in an imperfect and decentralized market network for credits, deposits and project equity. Agents engage in new power plant investments either through a special purpose vehicle in a project finance (PF) structure or via standard corporate finance (CF). The model portrays the growth of new power generation capacity, taking into account technological differences and investment risks associated with the power market. Different scenarios are contrasted to investigate the influence of PF investments on the transition. Further, the effectiveness of a simple green credit easing (GCE) mechanism is discussed. The results show that varying the composition of the PF and CF strategies significantly influences the transition speed. GCE can recover the pace of the transition, even under drastic reductions in PF. The model serves as a foundational framework for more in-depth policy analysis within larger agent-based integrated assessment models.

Keywords: Agent-based modeling; Energy finance; Financial network interactions; Heterogeneity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s11403-024-00425-z

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