Social networks, norm-enforcing ties and cooperation

Renan Goetz () and Jorge Marco
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Renan Goetz: University of Girona
Jorge Marco: University of Girona

Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, 2025, vol. 20, issue 2, No 3, 412 pages

Abstract: Abstract We study cooperation and group pressure on social networks by introducing a new concept termed norm-enforcing ties. By combining network characteristics and agents’ actions, direct and indirect norm-enforcing ties extend and refine the concept of social ties as well as the role of the tightness of a group as drivers of group pressure and cooperation. The results show that a strong commitment by agents with collective interests, or a high degree of confrontation between agents minimizes the effect of indirect norm-enforcing ties on cooperation. The analysis in terms of the agent’s utility reveals that an increase in indirect norm-enforcing ties does not necessarily lead to a decrease in the critical mass of compliers supporting cooperation. We demonstrate that network-oriented policies are more efficient in promoting cooperation than are standard economic policy instruments when the expected value of direct norm-enforcing ties is sufficiently large compared to the tightness of the group. Otherwise, standard economic policy instruments are more efficient.

Keywords: Social norms; Social network; Cooperation; Social dilemma; Network-oriented policies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D85 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s11403-024-00435-x

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