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The Non-cooperative Game and Cooperative Game Between Independent Innovation Firm and Imitative Innovation Firm

Shaohua Qin ()
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Shaohua Qin: Luo Yang Normal University

Journal of the Knowledge Economy, 2024, vol. 15, issue 2, No 16, 5443-5465

Abstract: Abstract We divide innovative firms into independent innovation firm and imitative innovation firm. In this paper, we study the game between independent and imitative innovative firms. Their games include non-cooperative games and cooperative games. Using the model, we argue that the optimal game strategy for independent and imitating innovators is to play a cooperative game. They will both get higher expected returns by playing a cooperative game. This is also the case in the long run. Cooperation should be an important option in the inter-firm game.

Keywords: Independent innovation; Imitative innovation; Game; Cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B21 C71 C72 C78 D21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s13132-023-01166-3

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