Endogenous age discrimination

Christian Manger ()

Journal of Population Economics, 2014, vol. 27, issue 4, 1087-1106

Abstract: This paper shows that hiring discrimination against old workers occurs in imperfect labour markets even if individual productivity does not decrease with age and in the absence of a taste for discrimination. Search and informational frictions generate unemployment, with less productive workers facing higher risks of unemployment. Therefore, the employment status provides a signal for expected productivity. This stigma of unemployment becomes stronger with individual age and reduces the hiring opportunities of older workers. Political measures such as a reduction in dismissal protection can help to restore efficiency. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Keywords: Search frictions; Age discrimination; Unemployment; J14; J41; J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00148-013-0467-7

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