Distribution Effects of Extortion Racket Systems

Klaus G. Troitzsch ()
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Klaus G. Troitzsch: Universität Koblenz-Landau

A chapter in Advances in Artificial Economics, 2015, pp 181-193 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The paper discusses distribution effects of extortion racket systems which are quite frequent in several countries and sometimes are responsible for an unexpectedly high proportion of the regional gross domestic product. The model presented here takes a system perspective, leaving individual decision making processes for further publications. It represents consumers, enterprises, criminals and the state and tries to determine under which conditions extortion racket systems come into being, survive, and can be successfully fought.

Keywords: Shadow Economy; Shop Owner; Prosecution Success; Artificial Society; Main Input Parameter (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-319-09578-3_15

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-09578-3_15

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