Collective Efficiency in Two-Sided Matching

Tomoko Fuku, Akira Namatame () and Taisei Kaizouji ()
Additional contact information
Akira Namatame: National Defense Academy, Yokosuka
Taisei Kaizouji: International Christian University

A chapter in Artificial Economics, 2006, pp 115-126 from Springer

Abstract: Summary Gale and Shapley originally proposed the two-sided matching algorithm, Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DA). This is very brilliant method, but it has a demerit which produces. That is if men propose, it produces stable matching which is the best for men and the worst for women, and vise versa. In this paper, we propose a new algorithm with compromise that produce the balanced matching which are almost optimal for both sides. It is an important issue how far agents seek their own interests in a competitive environment. There are overwhelming evidences that support peoples are also motivated by concerns for fairness and reciprocity. We will show that compromise which is individually irrational improves the welfare of the whole groups. The reasonable compromise level is obtained as the function of the size of the group so that the social utility should be maximized. We also obtain large-scale properties of the proposed algorithm.

Keywords: Collective Efficiency; Stable Match; Social Utility; Assignment Game; Preference List (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-540-28547-2_10

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783540285472

DOI: 10.1007/3-540-28547-4_10

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().