The Wisdom of Networked Evolving Agents

Akira Namatame ()
Additional contact information
Akira Namatame: National Defense Academy

Chapter 11 in Advances in Artificial Economics, 2006, pp 149-165 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The fact that selfish behavior may not achieve full efficiency at the aggregate level has been well known in the literature. Therefore we need to cope with the socio-economic system by attempting to stack the deck in such a way that individuals with selfish incentives have to do what is the desirable thing. Of particular interests is the question how social interactions among individuals can be restructured so that they are free to choose their actions while avoiding outcomes that none would have chosen. In this paper, we study the collective construction process of social norms and the emergence of collective intelligence of networked evolving agents. The wisdom of collective agents is interpreted as emergence of behavioral rules that constitute constraints on social interactions so that self-interested agents can achieve efficient and equitable outcomes.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Social Norm; Coordination Game; Collective Intelligence; Behavioral Rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-540-37249-3_11

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783540372493

DOI: 10.1007/3-540-37249-0_11

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().