Multi-Criteria Simple Games

Luisa Monroy () and Francisco R. Fernández ()
Additional contact information
Luisa Monroy: Universidad de Sevilla
Francisco R. Fernández: Universidad de Sevilla. Tarfia s/n.

A chapter in Multiobjective Programming and Goal Programming, 2009, pp 157-166 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this paper multi-criteria simple games are introduced. These games constitute an extension of the basic framework of voting systems and related social-choice situations and are a natural tool for modelling these kinds of problems. After introducing and formally defining these games, the special class of monotonic multi-criteria games is characterized. In addition, we analyze core solution concepts for multi-criteria simple games*.

Keywords: Game theory; Multi-criteria analysis; Simple games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-540-85646-7_15

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783540856467

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-85646-7_15

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().