Fairness Norms in Ultimatum Exchanges

Christian Korth

Chapter Chapter 4 in Fairness in Bargaining and Markets, 2009, pp 57-80 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Investigations of fairness in bargaining have been one of the major microeconomic research topics during the last two decades. Countless studies have been published, and various models to explain observed behavior developed (see, e.g., Camerer 2003 for an overview). One extensive line of research investigates the relevance of reference points for individual behavior. Such a reference point might, for example, resemble a belief about the choice one should choose (compare Konow 2000 for a theory based on cognitive dissonance), or the default choice as in models with endowment effects. The literature on reference-dependent preferences can be traced back to the model of Tversky and Kahneman (1991). They base their model on Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory and shift the attention from the absolute outcome to the difference of an outcome to a given reference level (e.g., the status quo).

Keywords: Social Norm; Reference Price; Reservation Price; Subject Pool; Ultimatum Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-642-02253-1_4

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783642022531

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-02253-1_4

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla (sonal.shukla@springer.com) and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (indexing@springernature.com).