Price Rigidity in an Experimental Market

Christian Korth

Chapter Chapter 7 in Fairness in Bargaining and Markets, 2009, pp 139-167 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Experimental evidence of fair behavior in bilateral bargaining situations is well known, and the ultimatum game dominates publications in this domain. In contrast to studies of bilateral interactions, studies of market games mostly find limited or no effects of fairness, which leads many to cast doubt on the relevance of fairness in market settings.

Keywords: Trading Partner; Reference Price; Reservation Price; Ultimatum Game; Fair Price (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-642-02253-1_7

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-02253-1_7

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