 Spatial Monopsony and the Gender Pay GapBoris Hirsch ()
Chapter Chapter 5 in Monopsonistic Labour Markets and the Gender Pay Gap, 2010, pp 95-111 from Springer Abstract: Abstract In the following, we shall apply the reasoning from the short-run model in Chapter 3 to investigate the gender pay gap. We will employ the simplest model possible by considering a situation of dyopsony with constant individual labour supply. Furthermore, we will exclusively focus on the solution under the Bertrand–Nash assumption, i.e., under HS conjectures. Since we will allow for heterogeneity among firms and workers, we will derive the solution within a more explicitly game-theoretic approach – in terms of finding a Nash equilibrium to the wage-setting game played by the two firms – as the short cut via conjectural variations used hitherto loses its analytical convenience. But before setting up the model, we shall first say something about the gender pay gap and the standard explanations brought forward to deal with this empirical regularity. Keywords: Labour Supply; Travel Cost; Wage Differential; Male Worker; Wage Discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-642-10409-1_5 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-10409-1_5 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems from Springer |
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