Stochastic Programming Perspective on the Agency Problems Under Uncertainty

Alexei A. Gaivoronski () and Adrian Werner ()
Additional contact information
Alexei A. Gaivoronski: Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Adrian Werner: SINTEF Technology and Society

A chapter in Managing Safety of Heterogeneous Systems, 2012, pp 137-167 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We study the application of the stochastic programming framework to the analysis of complex agency problems under exogenous and endogenous uncertainty, presenting several models that deal with different types of such uncertainty. We demonstrate that the utilization of this framework extends the possibilities for the definition of parameters of incentive schedules. In this paper, we often refer to a model in a telecommunication environment consisting of a regulator (principal) and a service provider (agent) and study different aspects of regulation and licensing. However, the results can easily be generalized to other principal agent relationships.

Keywords: Agency Problem; Optimal Contract; Participation Constraint; Mathematical Program With Equilibrium Constraint; Stochastic Programming Problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-642-22884-1_7

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783642228841

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-22884-1_7

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().