 Selfish Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Airline AlliancesDemet Çetiner Chapter Chapter 7 in Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances, 2013, pp 111-132 from Springer Abstract: Abstract So far we have assumed that revenue management decisions of an alliance are made centrally such that the airlines maximize the revenue of the whole alliance. However, in an airline alliance, each airline makes its seat allocation decisions selfishly with the aim of maximizing its own revenue. In this chapter, we define several revenue sharing mechanisms, which are applied in a selfish setting and propose a method to evaluate the fairness of these mechanisms. The method includes a simulation model for the booking process of the alliance and uses the nucleolus-based revenue allocations as a benchmark. Through a numerical study, the fairness of the allocation mechanisms is compared with each other and against a random revenue sharing approach. In a further analysis, the fairness evaluation is performed by benchmarking the allocations to the Owen set-based allocations. Consistent results have been drawn from the two analyses. Keywords: Dual Solution; Revenue Share; Revenue Management; Fairness Evaluation; Alliance Partner (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-642-35822-7_7 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-35822-7_7 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems from Springer |
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