Cooperation Strategy of Intellectual Property Securitization in Supply Chain from Risk Perspective

Cheng Liu (), Wenjing Xie (), Qiuyuan Lei () and Xinzhong Bao ()
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Cheng Liu: University of Science and Technology Beijing
Wenjing Xie: University of Science and Technology Beijing
Qiuyuan Lei: University of Science and Technology Beijing
Xinzhong Bao: Beijing Union University

A chapter in LISS 2021, 2022, pp 24-34 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This paper uses the evolutionary game method to study the strategic choice of SMEs, financial institutions and investors in the financing of intellectual property supply chain securitization from the perspective of risk governance, and discusses the influence of various risk factors on the stable equilibrium. The results show that no matter how the initial strategy is chosen, the final game will evolve to “SMEs repay the rent on time, financial institutions perform the contract, investors buy subordinated bonds”. The credit risk of SMEs, intellectual property value evaluation risk and investor preference risk will affect the stable equilibrium of the game system.

Keywords: Intellectual property securitization; Supply chain; Tripartite evolutionary game; Risk governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnopch:978-981-16-8656-6_3

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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-16-8656-6_3

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