How German, Japanese, and U.S. Executives View Markets and Planning as Alternative Coordinating Mechanisms
William G. Egelhoff () and
Erich Frese
Additional contact information
William G. Egelhoff: Fordham University
Erich Frese: University of Cologne
Management International Review, 2011, vol. 51, issue 4, No 4, 532 pages
Abstract:
Abstract Markets and central planning are alternative mechanisms for coordinating economic activity within economies and firms. A multi-level economics literature describes and contrasts the coordinating characteristics of markets and planning. While it assumes these characteristics reflect the perceptions and decisions of economic actors, this behavioural assumption has not been tested. Based on the literature, the study develops hypotheses specifying how executives will perceive the coordinating characteristics of markets and planning. Using existing theory about individualism-collectivism, the study further hypotheses how the perceptions are likely to vary between individualistic and collectivistic cultures. When tested with a sample of top German, Japanese, and U.S. executives, the results, with two exceptions, support the hypotheses. Going beyond the hypotheses, the study explores the preferences and underlying logic of executives across nationalities. German and U.S. executives share a similar cognitive structure. Japanese executives exhibit a different cognitive structure which reflects a more collectivistic culture. The study emphasizes the importance of testing the basic behavioural assumptions of economics and the need to consider culture a potential moderator of such assumptions.
Keywords: Markets; Planning; Executive preferences; Germany; Japan; United States (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11575-011-0084-1 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:manint:v:51:y:2011:i:4:d:10.1007_s11575-011-0084-1
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/11575
DOI: 10.1007/s11575-011-0084-1
Access Statistics for this article
Management International Review is currently edited by Michael-Jörg Oesterle and Joachim Wolf
More articles in Management International Review from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().