Semiproportional values for TU games

Anna B. Khmelnitskaya and Theo S. H. Driessen

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2003, vol. 57, issue 3, 495-511

Abstract: The goal of the paper is to introduce a family of values for transferable utility cooperative games that are proportional for two-person games and as well satisfying some combinatorial structure composed by contributions of complementary coalitions or, to less extent, marginal contributions by players. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Keywords: Key words: cooperative TU game; value; proportional sharing; probabilistic model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:mathme:v:57:y:2003:i:3:p:495-511

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DOI: 10.1007/s001860200271

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