The natural frequency hypothesis and evolutionary arguments
Yuichi Amitani ()
Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, 2015, vol. 14, issue 1, 19 pages
Abstract:
In the rationality debate, Gerd Gigerenzer and his colleagues have argued that human’s apparent inability to follow probabilistic principles does not mean our irrationality, because we can do probabilistic reasoning successfully if probability information is given in frequencies, not percentages (the natural frequency hypothesis). They also offered an evolutionary argument to this hypothesis, according to which using frequencies was evolutionarily more advantageous to our hominin ancestors than using percentages, and this is why we can reason correctly about probabilities in the frequency format. This paper offers a critical review of this evolutionary argument. I show that there are reasons to believe using the frequency format was not more adaptive than using the standard (percentage) format. I also argue that there is a plausible alternative explanation (the nested-sets hypothesis) for the improved test performances of experimental subjects—one of Gigerenzer’s key explananda—which undermines the need to postulate mental mechanisms for probabilistic reasoning tuned to the frequency format. The explanatory thrust of the natural frequency hypothesis is much less significant than its advocates assume. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015
Keywords: Probabilistic reasoning; Fast and frugal heuristics; Ecological rationality; Evolutionary psychology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11299-014-0155-7 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:minsoc:v:14:y:2015:i:1:p:1-19
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/11299
DOI: 10.1007/s11299-014-0155-7
Access Statistics for this article
Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences is currently edited by Riccardo Viale
More articles in Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences from Springer, Fondazione Rosselli Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().