A New Allocation Method for Simple Bargaining Problems: The Shapley Rule

Francesc Carreras () and Guillermo Owen ()
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Francesc Carreras: Technical University of Catalonia
Guillermo Owen: Naval Postgraduate School

A chapter in Operations Research Proceedings 2012, 2014, pp 225-230 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Simple bargaining problems with transferable utility are considered. By associating a quasi-additive cooperative game with each one of them, a Shapley rule for this class of problems is derived from the Shapley value for games. The analysis of this new rule includes axiomatic characterizations and a comparison with the proportional rule.

Keywords: Shapley Rule; Proportional Rule; Shapley Value; Axiomatic Characterization; Cooperative Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:oprchp:978-3-319-00795-3_33

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-00795-3_33

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