Competition for Resources

Max Klimm ()
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Max Klimm: Technische Universität Berlin

A chapter in Operations Research Proceedings 2013, 2014, pp 249-254 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Congestion games are an elegant model to study the effects of selfish usage of resources. In my thesis—of the same title as this note—we characterized the maximal conditions for which the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium can be guaranteed for four variants of congestion games: weighted congestion games, congestion games with resource-dependent demands, congestion games with variable demands, and bottleneck congestion games. This note reviews the main results obtained there.

Keywords: Cost Function; Strategy Profile; Congestion Game; Variable Demand; Private Cost (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:oprchp:978-3-319-07001-8_34

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-07001-8_34

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