Effects of Profit Taxes in Matrix Games

Marlis Bärthel ()
Additional contact information
Marlis Bärthel: Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

A chapter in Operations Research Proceedings 2014, 2016, pp 77-82 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract It is consensus in different fields of practical relevance that the introduction of taxes will—in one way or the other—affect the playing behavior of actors. However, it is not clear what the effects might really look like. Here, a game theoretic model is considered that concentrates on effects of relative or constant taxes on transferred monetary volume. For matrix games it is asked: How do taxes change the behavior of players and the expected transacted volume? Analyzing this basic research model clearly shows: One has to be careful in considering taxes as a powerful instrument to confine aggressive playing behavior. Taxes might encourage increased expected transfers.

Keywords: Matrix Game; Profit Tax; Expect Trans Fer (ET); Constant Tax; Model-based Research (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:oprchp:978-3-319-28697-6_12

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783319286976

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-28697-6_12

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Operations Research Proceedings from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().