On the Discriminative Power of Tournament Solutions

Felix Brandt () and Hans Georg Seedig ()
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Felix Brandt: Technische Universität München
Hans Georg Seedig: Technische Universität München

A chapter in Operations Research Proceedings 2014, 2016, pp 53-58 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Tournament solutions constitute an important class of social choice functions that only depend on the pairwise majority comparisons between alternatives. Recent analytical results have shown that several concepts with appealing axiomatic properties tend to not discriminate at all when the tournaments are chosen from the uniform distribution. This is in sharp contrast to empirical studies which have found that real-world preference profiles often exhibit Condorcet winners, i.e., alternatives that all tournament solutions select as the unique winner. In this work, we aim to fill the gap between these extremes by examining the distribution of the number of alternatives returned by common tournament solutions for empirical data as well as data generated according to stochastic preference models.

Keywords: Tournament Solutions; Condorcet Winner; Social Choice Function; Pairwise Majority Comparisons; Preference Profile (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-28697-6_8

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