Cost Allocation for Horizontal Carrier Coalitions Based on Approximated Shapley Values

Kristian Schopka () and Herbert Kopfer ()
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Kristian Schopka: University of Bremen
Herbert Kopfer: University of Bremen

A chapter in Operations Research Proceedings 2015, 2017, pp 133-140 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract To improve competitiveness, small and mid-sized carriers ally in horizontal carrier coalitions for request exchange. A crucial aspect for the long-term viability and stability of coalitions is a fair cost allocation among the agents. Despite of the long computing time, the well-known Shapley value has been used as a scheme for cost allocation. The contribution of this paper lies on the development of a suitable sampling procedure that approximates the Shapley value applied to cost allocations for the collaborative traveling salesman problem with time windows. A computational study identifies the deviation of the values generated by the proposed sampling procedures from the actual Shapley value.

Keywords: Marginal Contribution; Cost Allocation; Vehicle Route; Short Computing Time; Numerous Agent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:oprchp:978-3-319-42902-1_18

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-42902-1_18

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