Social Values and Cooperation. Results from an Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Experiment

Jürgen Fleiß () and Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger ()
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Jürgen Fleiß: University of Graz
Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger: University of Graz

A chapter in Operations Research Proceedings 2011, 2012, pp 199-204 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The following article deals with the question of cooperation in dilemma situations. We ran an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma experiment and measured the players social value orientation using the Ring Measure of Social Value. We then analyze the players behavior in the Prisoner’s Dilemma in relation to their social value orientation to test the hypotheses that prosocial players are more likely to cooperate. We find evidence that this is indeed the case. We do not find evidence that if two prosocial players interact with each other they achieve higher cooperation rates than two proself players or one prosocial and one proself player.

Keywords: Player Behavior; Social Dilemma; Ring Measure; Standard Economic Theory; Dilemma Situation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:oprchp:978-3-642-29210-1_32

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-29210-1_32

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