The Agency Theory and State-Owned Companies: Evidence from South Africa

Khazamula Stephen Shiburi (), Benjamin Marx () and Rozanne Smiith ()
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Khazamula Stephen Shiburi: University of Johannesburg
Benjamin Marx: University of Johannesburg
Rozanne Smiith: University of Johannesburg

A chapter in Embracing Technological Agility in Accounting and Business – Vol. 2, 2026, pp 339-353 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The literature is replete with studies using the agency theory to examine the relationship between shareholders and executives of private entities. However, few researchers have applied the agency theory to state-owned entities. Against this background, this study examines key agency theory issues within schedule two state-owned entities in South Africa, including identifying agents and principals, information asymmetry, conflicts of interest, and differences in risk attitudes. The study approach takes the form of a snowballing systematic literature review of articles published in peer-reviewed journals that were indexed in the Scopus databases. This study finds that South African citizens are the principals of schedule two state-owned entities, whilst the government and executives are agents. In addition, there is evidence supporting conflicting interests, information asymmetry, and differential risk attitudes between the government, executives, and the public in the South African schedule two state-owned entities. This study provides evidence of agency problems in South African schedule two state-owned entities, offering insights for policymakers on governance reforms to enhance accountability and efficiency.

Keywords: Agency theory; Conflict of interest; Information asymmetry; Principal and agent; Risk-attitude; South Africa; State-owned entities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:prbchp:978-3-032-13384-7_24

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-13384-7_24

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