Micro-level Evidences of Moral Hazard in the European Financial Institutions

Karel Janda () and Oleg Kravtsov ()
Additional contact information
Karel Janda: University of Economics, Prague
Oleg Kravtsov: University of Economics, Prague

A chapter in The Impact of Globalization on International Finance and Accounting, 2018, pp 89-98 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This article examines the evidences of moral hazard and the determinants of risk-taking among 500 banks in Central Europe, the Baltic, and Balkan region. We analyze moral hazard incentives and investigate which factors impact the risk profile of the banks in empirical relationships between shareholders, bank managers, regulatory restraints, and ownership structure. We find strong link between level of risk-taking and bank manager performance and efficiency, which supports the theoretical argumentation of the moral hazard. The capital requirements and regulatory concerns exhibit significant effect on the risk-taking behavior. A positive relation between government ownership and risk profile is observed in the dataset.

Keywords: Moral hazard; Risk-taking; Non-performing loans (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:prbchp:978-3-319-68762-9_10

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783319687629

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-68762-9_10

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Proceedings in Business and Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().