Contracts as Cooperation: About an Implicit Ethics of Transactions

Jean Müßgens () and Birger P. Priddat
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Jean Müßgens: Zeppelin University
Birger P. Priddat: University Witten/Herdecke, Zeppelin University

A chapter in The Relational View of Economics, 2022, pp 311-331 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The rational choice is based on the representation of a monoregular, balanced market environment. It ignores the fact that a minimal sociology is created through the transaction as the smallest unit of analysis. On this basis, allocative couplings are created which go beyond the assertion of efficient allocations. Away from the mutual advantage appropriation, under the premise of mutual mistrust contingency, it is also about exploring the potential for cooperation. In the bilateral relationship of the transaction, the actors are open to admitting something to the other beyond the maximization of their advantage. This insight is important if one considers that economic activity is constituted within social networks and relationships. These interrelationships become apparent in the dispositive of the gift-economy. It refers to the “implicit ethics” of bilateral service relationships, particularly effective at the digital economy's core.

Keywords: Relational economy; Digital economy; Social networks; Gift-economy; Relational transaction; Markets and Non-markets; Ethics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:recchp:978-3-030-86526-9_16

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-86526-9_16

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